Recommendations to End 21st Century Online “Stop and Frisk” Policing

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At A Glance

Policy Gaps & Abuses
- Social Media exists currently outside the jurisdiction of the Fourth Amendment, which was used to argue for the end of “Stop and Frisk,” however modern usage should cause reevaluation. 
- Law enforcement’s skewed fieldwork procedures (NYPD gang databases, social media/network analysis, licensing social media data aggregator sites) is leveraged by prosecutors as conspiracy charges in that they include/allow for the creation of social media-based evidence. 
- Lack of an investigative framework that employs community based analysis, through community stakeholders reading/analyzing posts, followed by creation of policies that aim to address the root cause (social, economic, demographic etc.) of issues that lead to violence on and offline. 
- Lack of accountability & transparency in how police procure social media data.

Recommendations
- Demand department disclosure of contracts with firms that farm data from social media sites and subsequent public announcements of new data streams they use for surveillance. 
- Center community involvement in the analysis of online posts prior to offline police involvement in court orders, arrests, or judgements. 
- Create a process of exoneration of those currently imprisoned and that have been punished due to social media monitoring. 
- If information is acquired via social media analysis and media aggregation should have a shelf-life. After date of expiry, data should be expunged and community members should be notified that they are in police databases.

Desired Outcomes
- The end of online police surveillance of Black and Brown youth. 
- Pressure tech and law enforcement to follow company protocols and policies that protect users from unjust online database search methods, to be outlined by the Fourth Amendment. 
- Freedom for BIPOC individuals outside of law enforcement surveillance.
Purpose

Advocates have long called for the end of racist and punitive justice systems, exemplified through the New York Police Department’s (NYPD) “Stop and Frisk” protocols, which have been proven to have negative effects on Black and Latinx youth's mental and physical health, from the anxiety inducing aggressive stops, to the time spent physically detained. Law enforcement’s response to advocate’s calls came through the shift from in-person violations of privacy and freedom to the gradual “datification” or online explosion of the criminal justice system. This draws attention to the imperative demand for legislation, which regulates social media tech companies, that would also include protections against racially disparate treatment of Black, Indigenous, and communities of color (BIPOC) online. This post “Stop and Frisk” digital policing included the active creation of online accounts and profiles using faux identities as well as buying data from a third party using the same methodology in order to be included into the networks the NYPD wished to surveil. They argued that by being accepted as “friends” or “followers” they bypassed the privacy laws which stood to protect the information shared online through social media sites.

Due to the perpetually changing nature of the online world, the current laws that cover protections to citizen's privacy and bodies, do not always cover the entirety of their personhood online, thus allowing for surveillance. To promote inclusivity and reduce racial bias, we recommend policy centered on Restorative Justice principles of community involvement- specifically through social media post analysis, to add layers of interpretation prior to law enforcement surveillance and offline involvement. Restorative Justice requires the shift from the punishment of those violating the law, to centering any community members who have a stake in the specific offense and to collectively identify and address harms, needs, and obligations, in order to heal and put things as right as possible (Zehr, 2002). It is a reframing of who justice should serve, as we believe the addition of those community stakeholders, social justice advocates, youth educators, etc would bring necessary background. Ever emerging technologies necessitate a wide range of experts, social groups, cultures, races, and ethnicities in Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems development (Chen et al., 2020), and in this case, social media surveillance.

Background

The SAFElab at Columbia University, which consists of social workers, community members and data scientists, examines ethical technologies and how algorithms, machine learning, and digital surveillance impact Black and Latinx communities (Patton et al. 2018; Patton et al. 2019). Of particular interest is the role of social media as a digital neighborhood (Stevens, R. et al., 2017), which has become a community context and integral source of news and communication for youth. Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, along with countless other social media platforms, are easily accessible on any device connected to the Internet, and their ability to connect people to the world makes them appealing. Social media usage is prolific amongst teens, with “95% of all teens between 12-17 online; and 80% of those online are users of social media sites” (Madden et. al., 2020) leading to a good proportion of communications being held online in this age group.
However, the interactions and usage of social media platforms can be performative (Johnson, 2013) in that some content posted on these platforms may be inconsistent (DeAndrea & Walther, 2011) with real-life presentation. Patton et. al. (2019) suggest that while computational tools offer new ways of understanding the links between social media communication and gun violence, there are real concerns about the potential for misinterpreting images on social media in the absence of sufficient context. The varied meaning, that of the poster vs that interpreted by law enforcement, of these posts is the critical sticking point, especially in cases where law enforcement agencies rely on them as evidence for investigative purposes.

This widespread digital policing has serious implications for Black and Brown youth's lives in terms of the carceral system, as communities of color are socially construed/presented to be problematic sites. High density populations of Black and Brown citizens are espoused to have higher rates of crime, which necessitates increased policing, though as previously referenced the rates of crime between races does not differ. Law enforcement creates this technological gaze, that hyperfixates on the socially created problematic sites, morphing the goal from proactive policing to proactive punishment, entrapping innocent individuals. In light of this, the procedures that law enforcement follow do little to protect or police in a way that centers rehabilitation and growth. Evidence has shown that gang-associated youth commonly use social media to challenge rivals, but most of these confrontations are not escalating to offline violence and, in some instances, deterring it (De Witte & Stanford, 2019). The digitalization of policing has provided a new space where similar offline issues persist and are exacerbated within marginalized populations.

When discussing law enforcement's role in social media monitoring, a 2018 report by the Brennan Center for Justice shows then New York City Chief of Detectives, Dermot Shea, saying that public social media platforms are like public places and hence are patrolled by the NYPD. However, NYPD's previous failures to patrol equitably, i.e. "Stop and Frisk," serve as proof of the possible racial disparities through online surveillance. Such 'patrols' of activities (including but not limited to liking/commenting on a post) can land an individual on the NYPD gang database. This database disproportionately patrols and targets communities of color: with only 1.1% of the people on the gang database are White, with 66% Black and 31.7% Latinx, with children as young as 13 years old being added (Pinto, 2019). The NYPD does not communicate placement on this gang database, yet being on this database can have negative consequences such as a decrease in the likelihood of release on bail, long sentences, and possible interactions with Immigration and Customs Enforcements (ICE) when the individual is an immigrant (Robinson, 2018). The most alarming issue however, is the lack of transparency as to how the NYPD determines who lands on this database. Even when barred from direct monitoring, law enforcement agencies use data collected from social media platforms either directly found or through private organizations like Geofeedia or Snaptrends for investigations without these steps taken. The platforms often use provocative pictures of women found online to add individuals as friends or followers, then tracking users' locations across social media sites, regardless of whether they geo-tag their posts publicly or not (Bousquet, 2018). This problem is not peculiar to the NYPD, as police departments, cities, and counties across the nation spend huge sums of money on social media monitoring tools. These disproportionate statistics are found across the U.S. and showcase the racialized undertones that this subversive form of policing
has taken. The shift to Restorative Justice grounds our ask for community analysis as a foundation of law enforcement’s interactions with youth of color around social media postings.

Social workers often operate from a space of translating dualities, leading to the development of a social work-based computational approach to this sensitive research, relying on analysis as distanced as possible from personal bias. This practice has created a system that mostly operates as a trap for Black and Brown communities who perform illegal activities, to no higher degree than White communities, but are policed at much higher rates through every level of the criminal justice system—see QANON vs BLM or the lack of Proud Boy members on NYPD’s gang database (Pinto, 2019). A review completed in January 2021 of law enforcement’s response to more than 13,000 protests showed police were three times as likely to use force against leftwing vs rightwing protestors (Beckett, 2021).

Inequities in police perspective of danger leads to the need for communities to monitor posts and de-escalate situations when necessary. This can be achieved through restorative justice community based analysis of posts conducted by community-based experts (these are individuals who share the same cultural background and understand the colloquial language of these youths) with the help of social work based computational approaches. The purpose of this analysis is to determine the underlying meaning of a post and when appropriate discuss with stakeholders and prevent the actualization of violence in real life. However, the current monitoring by law enforcement agencies specifically targets and discriminates (Marciniak, 2015) against people of color, especially youth (Triola, 2020).

Policy Gaps & Abuses of Power

The internet brought with it a “Wild West” realm where infringements upon the Fourth Amendment are sanctioned and sought after methods of law enforcement policing. We need social media monitoring policy to be conditional on more than an officer’s “reasonable suspicion” that an individual is engaged in criminal conduct. With data available through examination of pre and post “Stop and Frisk” policing, which was found unconstitutional as it infringed on Fourth Amendment Rights, we propose similar restrictions be enforced. While some States require that people identify themselves at the request of police, the Supreme Court has ensured that those laws require a predicate of reasonable suspicion.

Even with regulations independently created by large tech companies, law enforcement actively works to bypass tech organization regulations, even with the regulations specifically cutting access to law enforcement. After the creation of policy by tech organizations that expelled law enforcement from direct monitoring of social media sites, 500 U.S. law enforcement agencies began to license other private companies, Geofreedia, Amazon Ring, and Snaptrends, who have access to back-end developer tools that surveil social media sites (Cameron, 2020). In addition to clear attempts to circumnavigate anti-surveillance regulations, non-profit Working Narratives of North Carolina revealed that “one of Geofeedia’s goals is to bypass the privacy options offered to users on social media sites.”
The current political staging doesn’t require that teens be aware of a specific plan or crime in order to be found guilty of conspiracy. Using California Law as example, Chris Lawson, a San Diego prosecutor, listed out the three necessary components to be able to bring a conspiracy charge against gang members: 1) knowledge of a gang’s criminality, 2) active participation in the gang, and 3) intent to further the gang’s overall goals. Prosecutors and officers can, and do, glean evidence for all of this off social media through the methods previously listed.” By adding perspective targets through social media under pseudonyms, law enforcement is circumnavigating that predicate, thus allowing them to identify and surveil an individual without stopping or even talking to them. Our future proposals must ensure that the old regulations guarding personal privacy survives new technology.

**Policy Alternatives & Recommendations**

Given that social media and other technological advancements seem to be uncharted territory for many policy makers, it is imperative to take steps to ensure that these new technological advancements do not create new avenues or perpetuate old patterns of stereotyping and discriminating against people of color. We are seeing in-person discrimination transform alongside technology, to target and apply outstanding pressure on Black and Brown youth. That shift necessitates an emphasis on prevention in place of stereotyping and/or discriminating. A single arrest and conviction can come with many barriers, not limited to:

- Losing the right to vote
- Difficulty finding and maintaining a job
- Losing access to affordable housing
- Unlawful detainment

With this in mind, we must be future-oriented and ensure protection and prevention without discriminating against youth of color. We can trace the history of protective laws to 1967, where the Supreme Court ruled in *Katz v. United States*, to expand the Fourth Amendment protection against “unreasonable searches and seizures” to cover electronic wiretaps. This decision to expand came at the necessity to reimagine in the modern age- what would fall under someone’s “persons, houses, paper, and effects” as defined in the Constitution, adding the clause of “what [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public.” In the spirit of forward progress we recommend the following:

1. **End non-community analyzed i.e. solely police analyzed, surveillance of Black and Brown communities online**
   - This is our largest ask, as well as the most important. We must end the proactive surveillance that does little to stop crime, and instead criminalizes Black youth.
   - Transparency of the procedures of law enforcement placing individuals on the databases. Making the information public of placement on the database as well.
     - We don’t know about how social media surveillance is used to build the clearly disproportionate databases that have concrete impacts on youth’s justice involvement/criminal outcomes.
● Implement a system of community involvement to verify and interpret information being collected by law enforcement, all in accordance with the Fourth Amendment
  - A community composed group, potentially housed in a research lab or non-profit, operating to interpret posts/posters that may be “interesting” to law enforcement.
  - This will work as the first line of defense in correcting data and posts from becoming misinterpreted or being left unheard. The primary goal of policing should not be centered on arrest and conviction, but rather on understanding, rehabilitation, and growth.

2. **Enforce Tech company protocols to protect users from unjust search methods by law enforcement or private organization**

● Stop developers from using or selling data obtained on their platforms to provide tools that are used for surveillance by law enforcement or other parties.
  - “We prohibit developers using the Public APIs and Gnip data products from allowing law enforcement — or any other entity — to use Twitter data for surveillance purposes. Period.” (Twitter, 2016)
  - “We are adding language to our Facebook and Instagram platform policies to more clearly explain that developers cannot ‘use data obtained from us to provide tools that are used for surveillance.’ Our goal is to make our policy explicit” (Facebook, 2017)

● End the ability for police to circumnavigate privacy protocols by adding individuals under surveillance via undercover accounts as a form of entrapment and via contracts with private monitoring services (Geofreedia, Snaptrends, etc)
  - The FBI and police departments must refrain from biased searching of social media posts and from creating databases as a method of modern surveillance.
  - End usage of non-official social media accounts for investigations, with or without written permission from those investigated.
  - Transparency around records, history, and racial biases concerning conspiracy charges
  - If information is acquired via social media analysis and media aggregation should have a shelf-life. After date of expiry, data should be expunged and community members should be notified that they are in police databases

● End conspiracy charges that are formed based on information gleaned from social media surveillance

3. **Exoneration of those who have been punished due to social media monitoring**

● Transparency in how law enforcement has gathered and used data from social media platforms in prior convictions, as well as establishing a system/pathway for exoneration of those previously or currently serving time.

● Removal/wipe of online history of law enforcement interaction that does not lead to conviction
  - In her book “Digital Punishment,” Sarah Esther Lageson shares the story of Shana, who had her mugshot pop up every time she Googled her name. Shana is terrified in the photo that was taken at her first and only arrest in Florida after a fight broke out
in a nightclub. The arrest never led to any criminal charges, and Shana went home several hours later. Within weeks, her mugshot was posted to dozens of websites, with her full name and address underneath the photo. She became ashamed of her identity all the while jobs and networking were being hindered causing her livelihood to be affected tremendously. Even attempts to control the "search engine optimization" (SEO) by adding positive personal information to the internet was not completely successful in getting rid of the negative mugshots, as her mugshot still showed as one of the top results.

**Conclusion**

The policies suggested in this memo outline regulations to curb social media monitoring done by judicial systems. We must begin by de-centering the power that is held by law enforcement and tech organizations by bringing in the community as a first line of evaluation for anything online that is being used as evidence. Coinciding with the cross referential analysis, new restrictions must be put in place on both law enforcement as well as the organizations that place both transparency on past actions as well as restrictions on current and future tactics.

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**SAFE Lab & Contact Details**

The SAFE lab is a research initiative focused on examining the ways in which youth of color navigate violence on and offline. Drawing on computational and social work approaches to research, we engage in qualitative and natural language processing methods to understand the mechanisms of violence and how to prevent and intervene in violence that occurs in neighborhoods and social media environments.

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Endnotes

1. “65.5% of Police officers are White (Non-Hispanic), making that the most common race or ethnicity in the occupation. Representing 12.8% of Police officers, Black (Non-Hispanic) is the second most common race or ethnicity in this occupation.” https://datausa.io/profile/soc/police-officers#demographics

2. “Black and Brown youth age 16-24 who reported more police contact also reported more trauma and anxiety symptoms, associations tied to how many stops they reported, the intrusiveness of the encounters, and their perceptions of police fairness” (Geller, A., Fagan, J., Tyler, T., & Link, B. G., 2014)


4. “In appreciating racial/ethnic differences in street crime rates, it is important to keep in mind that whites commit most white-collar crime, and especially corporate crime, as it is white people who lead and manage our many corporations. Just as social class affects the type of crime that people do, so do race and ethnicity. Wealthy, white people commit much crime, but it is white-collar crime they tend to commit, not street crime.” (Social problems: Continuity and change, 2015)

5. Theorizing the differences between White and BIPOC disparate rates of street/white collar crime.“The social isolation and racial privileges experienced by Whites (particularly when combined with relative financial advantage) contribute to the formation of frames that undermine the development of empathy toward anonymous others, encourage competition, and increase feelings of individual entitlement. These broad cognitive frameworks promote crime-specific frameworks, or techniques of neutralization, that promote white-collar offending.” (Sohoni, T., & Rorie, M., 2019)

6. The FBI ranked black nationalists and animal rights activists as bigger threats than white supremacists and terror groups like al-Qaida among their official counterterrorism priorities, according to leaked FBI documents obtained by The Young Turks.

7. Arizona, Indiana, Louisiana, and Nevada explicitly impose an obligation to provide identifying information, while 12 other states: Alabama, Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Utah, Wisconsin, police "may demand" identifying information.

8. In 2020 the Denver Police Department paid $30,000 for a one-year subscription to Geofreedia, opening the door for violation lawsuits as it goes against prior agreements to stop collecting information on individuals not suspected of crimes (Cameron, 2020).

9. Lawson later shared an anecdote to illustrate, saying “if you go out and represent yourself as a member of the Crip killers, and if shortly after you make threats online, a Crip is killed—even though we don’t know who pulled the trigger—we can hold you legally responsible for conspiracy to commit those murders.” The Verge article How the NYPD is using social media to put Harlem teens behind bars.

10. U.S. Const. amend. IV

11. “There is a knock on your door. It’s the police. There was a robbery in your neighborhood. They have a suspect in custody and an eyewitness. But they need your help: Will you come down to the station to stand in the line-up? This summer, the Government Accountability Office revealed that close to 64 million Americans do not have a say in corroborating or being an expert witness in communal disturbances.”

12. Facebook and Twitter have both specified that developers cannot “use data obtained from [the platform] to provide tools that are used for surveillance” or “from allowing law enforcement – or any other entity – to use...data for surveillance purposes.”

13. 16 States have let the FBI use face recognition technology to compare the faces of suspected criminals to their driver’s license and ID photos, creating a virtual line-up of their state residents without notification. However, in this line-up, it’s not a human that points to the suspect—it’s an algorithm, which we have previously discussed often hold bias against darker skin individuals via .The Perpetual Line Up - Unregulated Police Face Recognition in America

14. Seattle Police Officers have the ability to survey using non-official accounts if they had previously received written permission from the chief of police and maintain written log of all postings. https://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-5--employee-conduct/5125--social-media

15. https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-48276660#---text=Legislators%20in%20San%20Francisco%20have%2C%20or%20law%20enforcement